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gramming seems unquestionably a matter of taste, unimprov-
able by the Commission's present rules. For years broadcasters
have responded to the subtle approach to regulation -various
forms of policy pronouncements -and the Commission's rules
have remained virtually unchanged, thus provoking no litigation
of constitutional issues. But broadcasters' failure to improve
present program quality invites increased regulation by the FCC.
Experience has shown that broadcasters do not ignore policy pro-
nouncements so that the Commission is not forced into rule-mak-
ing. However, when broadcasting freedom faces serious limita-
tion, broadcasters will be less receptive to policy pronounce-
ments. At some point an impasse will be reached. Broadcasters
will balk, no longer responding to the subtle approach, and the
Commission will be forced to make rules incorporating broad
assumptions of authority in its quest to improve program qual-
ity. The result will be litigation involving delicate constitutional
problems of free speech.
If the Commission were to make rules that would attain a
higher degree of quality programming, it appears that it would
have a very difficult time sustaining them before the Court in
view of the existing interpretation of the free speech guarantee.
Perhaps the key to improved programming quality lies in the
following statement by Chairman Minow: "To those few broad-
casters and their professional associates who would evade the
nation's needs by crying, 'Censorship! Oh, where will it end?' I
ask, 'Responsibility! When will it begin?'- 84
David S. Bell
CLASSIFYING MINERAL INTERESTS-
MINERAL SERVITUDE V. MINERAL ROYALTY
In Louisiana jurisprudence the distinction between the rights
and obligations that accompany an ordinary mineral royalty and
those that accompany an ordinary mineral servitude is well set-
tled.' Many conveyances or reservations of mineral interests,
84. Public Interest 33.
1. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575
(1960) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949) ; Hum-
ble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947) ; Union Sulphur
Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178 (1947); St. Martin Land Co. v.
Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1,
187 So. 35 (1939).
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however, do not fall neatly into one classification or the other
because the person who drafted the instrument did not clearly
understand the distinction, or because the instrument was
drafted before the interests were judicially distinguished, or
because the parties desired to create an interest which lies some-
where between the two. The subject of this inquiry is the prob-
lems encountered in conveying and interpreting interests that
are not distinctly either ordinary mineral royalties or ordinary
mineral servitudes.
MINERAL SERVITUDE V. MINERAL ROYALTY
A mineral servitude is defined in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co.
v. Salling's Heirs2 as a right in the nature of a servitude to go
upon land and reduce its minerals to possession.3 A mineral roy-
alty, on the other hand, was defined in Vincent v. Bullock4 as a
real obligation conditioned upon production-a passive interest
only in a share of production. 5 Although in some respects the
rights acquired are similar, they differ significantly as to the
right to develop and the rules governing accrual of prescription.
The Right to Develop
The owner of a mineral servitude has the right to go on the
land to develop his interest, but the royalty owner does not, since
his is a purely passive interest in actual production.6 From this
2. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
3. Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 451, 43 So. 2d 782, 791
(1949) : "When oil and gas were first discovered in the State and the interests
of those asserting rights to such oil and gas as a result of sales or reservations
became controversial, this Court, recognizing that under our system of law there
can be no other land tenure than perfect ownership and imperfect ownership,
decreed that there could be no mineral estate in oil and gas as such and that
the sale or reservation of minerals was the mere grant or retention of a right
to go on the land for the exploration or exploitation of such minerals. Such
right was classified as being a real right in the nature of a servitude, to be gov-
erned by the laws of this State on the subject matter."
4. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
5. A mineral royalty should be distinguished, as a matter of definition, from
a "lease royalty" and an "overriding royalty." A lease royalty is that interest
in a share of the production retained by the landowner and/or mineral owners
which forms part of the consideration for granting the mineral lease. The remain-
ing interest in production granted to the lessee under a mineral lease is called
the "working interest." Any royalty right carved out of the working interest
is termed an "overriding royalty." Neither the lease royalty nor the overriding
royalty exists independently of the lease, and both are governed by the law of
leases. On the other hand, a mineral royalty is a passive interest in production
which may be granted subject to a mineral lease, but is a real obligation existing
independently of such lease, and can be created without reference to any lease.
6. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 1020, 117
So. 2d 575, 577 (1960) : "It is also well established that the right to search and
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right to develop flows the right to grant a mineral lease, which
not only is the ordinary means of ultimately obtaining produc-
tion but also can be lucrative in itself because of bonuses paid
for the lease and delay rentals paid to perpetuate it. Hence,
the possessor of an unqualified mineral servitude is entitled to
develop his interest, to grant leases, and to receive a proportion-
ate share of the bonuses and rentals, whereas the royalty owner
has none of these rights.7
Accrual of Prescription
A mineral servitude is governed by the prescriptive rules
applicable to servitudes and thus is lost by ten years' nonuser.8
However, this servitude may be used by a good faith effort, even
though unsuccessful, to obtain production.9 A mineral royalty,
on the other hand, is treated as a conditional real obligation,
and thus is lost by prescription liberandi causa upon nonoccur-
rence of the condition-production-within ten years after it is
created. 10 Therefore, good faith drilling operations will rescue
a mineral servitude from loss by prescription, while production
alone will preserve a mineral royalty.
Under certain circumstances, the nature of the interest deter-
mines in whose favor it prescribes-the landowner or the min-
explore, which is implicit in the grant of a mineral servitude, does not attach
to the sale of royalty and that the royalty owner's right to share in the produc-
tion is necessarily dependent upon the development of the property by either
the landowner and/or the mineral owner, in cases in which a servitude has been
created, or 'by a mineral lessee, holding under a lease from the landowner or
mineral owner or both."
7. Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 526, 41 So. 2d 73, 75 (1949)
"The owner of the mineral right has the right of ingress to, and egress from,
the land, the right to produce the minerals, the right to participate in the
bonuses and delay rentals paid under the terms of any lease. On the other
hand, the owner of a royalty right has none of these rights, nor is his consent
even necessary for the execution of a lease by the mineral owner, his right being
to share in production if and when it is had."
8. Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923) ; Nabors
Oil & Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 151 La. 361, 91 So. 765 (1922) ;
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
9. McMurrey v. Gray, 216 La. 904, 45 So. 2d 73 (1949) ; Hunter Co. v.
Ulrich, 200 La. 536, 8 'So. 2d 531 (1942) ; Lynn v. Harrington, 193 La. 877,
192 So. 517 (1939); Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135
So. 1 (1931).
10. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d
575 (1960); Gulf Refining Co. v. Hunter Co., 231 La. 1002, 93 So. 2d 537
(1957); LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299, 88 So. 2d 377
(1956); Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 299 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956); Union
Sulphur Co. v. Andrnu, 217 La. 662, 47 So. 2d 38 (1950) ; Continental Oil Co.
v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949) ; Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Guillory,
212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947) ; Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632,
33 So. 2d 178 (1947) ; St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d169 (1947) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
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eral servitude owner. If the right which prescribed was a min-
eral servitude, then its extinction inures to the benefit of the
landowner. However, if the prescribed interest was a mineral
royalty which was conveyed either by a servitude owner or by
a landowner who has subsequently created a servitude covering
the same interest, then the owner of the mineral servitude inter-
est out of which the royalty was carved profits through extin-
guishment of the obligation imposed on his interest."
INSTRUMENTS CLEARLY CONVEYING EITHER MINERAL SERVITUDES
OR MINERAL ROYALTIES
Mineral Servitudes
Common law jurisdictions, absent statutory regulation, per-
mit the sale of minerals in place. 1 2 In consequence of this in-
fluence from common law states, most deeds in Louisiana that
convey mineral servitudes contain language in the form of a sale
or reservation from the sale of land similar to the following:
"Grantor . . . does hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey,
transfer, assign and deliver unto ... Grantee, an undivided
... [fractional] ... interest in and to all of the oil, gas and
other minerals in and under and that may be produced from
the following described lands . . ., together with the right
of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining,
drilling, exploring, operating and developing said lands ....
"This sale is made subject to any rights now existing...
under any valid and subsisting oil and gas lease. . .; it being
understood and agreed that said Grantee shall have, receive,
and enjoy the herein granted undivided interest in and to all
bonuses, rents, royalties and other benefits which may accrue
under the terms of said lease .... "13
11. Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1959)
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Sanders, 224 La. 448, 69 So. 2d 745 (1954).
12. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 201-16 (1959).
13. OAKES, STANDARD OIL AND GAS FoRMS 197-98 (1952). See Hodges v.
Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 240 La. 198, 121 So. 2d 831 (1960); Arkansas Fuel
Oil Co. v. Sanders, 224 La. 448, 69 So. 2d 745 (1953) ; McMurrey v. Gray, 216
La. 904, 45 So. 2d 73 (1949) ; Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 35 So. 2d 219
(1948) ; Gregory v. Central Coal & Coke Corp., 197 La. 95, 200 So. 832 (1941) ;
Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940); Smith v. Anisman,
85 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) (mineral acres); Bennett v. Robinson,
25 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946). The deed may express a sale or reserva-
tion of the right to the minerals rather than a sale of the minerals themselves:
Leiter Minerals v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961) (right to
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In the quoted conveyance, the phrase essential to creation of
a servitude seems to be "an undivided ... [fractional] ... inter-
est in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and
under and that may be produced from the following described
lands . . ." The Louisiana courts have definitively held that
the right of ingress and egress and the right to share in the lease
benefits are implicit in the purchase of a mineral servitude. 14
Consequently, failure to reserve these rights does not affect the
nature of the interest. A different situation may exist, however,
if the quoted phrase is qualified by additional stipulations. This
problem will be discussed later.
Mineral Royalties
The language used to create mineral royalties has not been
so uniform as that used to create mineral servitudes. Most deeds
specify in some way that the interest acquired is royalty:
(1) "1/16 royalty of all the oil, gas and other minerals pro-
duced and saved from said premises .... "15
(2) "A royalty interest of 1/256th out of all of the oil, gas,
sulphur and other minerals, that may be produced .... 16
(3) "One-fourth interest in and to all royalties stipulated for
or hereafter to be stipulated for, in any oil, gas or min-
eral lease . . .17
.mine and remove) ; State ex rel. Bourgaux v. Fontenot, 192 La. 95, 187 So. 66
(1939) (mineral rights) Calhoun v. Ardis, 174 La. 420, 141 So. 15 (1932)
(mineral rights); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756,
91 So. 207 (1922) (exclusive right and privilege to enter upon the lands, etc.).
The mineral rights may also be sold for a limited term: Munn v. Wadley, 192
La. 874, 877, 189 So. 561, 562 (1939) ("reserves . . . . for a term of thirty-
five (35) years, all oil, gas, sulphur and other minerals"); Hodges v. Norton,
200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942) (fifteen years).
14. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 719, 70 So. 2d 657, 660 (1954)
"Such a reservation under our long recognized and established jurisprudence
constitutes a servitude imposed upon the land, giving the owner thereof the
right of ingress and egress for the purpose of exploring for and reducing to
possession the minerals under the property so burdened. See Clark v. Tensas
Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931) (right to lease benefits).
15. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 7, 187 So. 35, 37 (1939). See Union
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1959) ; St. Martin
Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947).
16. Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 635, 33 So. 2d 178, 179
(1947).
17. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 649, 33 So. 2d 182,
183 (1947). This mineral royalty interest is charged against production only
if development is under a lease.
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(4) "1/32 royalty in and to mineral rights, lying in and
under the property above described ....
(5) "The royalty interests and rights herein sold, transferred
and conveyed are:
"1/32 of the whole of any oil, gas or other minerals
on and under and to be produced from said lands,
delivery of said royalties .... "19 (Emphasis added.)
All of the phrases quoted clearly convey only mineral royalties.20
Certain instruments, however, seem to convey a right which lies
somewhere between a mineral servitude and a mineral royalty.
CONTROVERSIAL INSTRUMENTS
The Louisiana Courts' Approach
In the last twenty years, eight instruments have been alleged
to convey a mineral servitude by one party and a mineral royalty
by another.2' On five of these occasions litigants have gone into
the courts bitterly contesting the nature of the interests con-
veyed by provisions similar to the following:
"Grantor conveys to Grantee an undivided . . . [frac-
tional] . . . interest in and to all of the oil, gas, and other
minerals in and under and that may be produced from the
following described lands ....
18. Martel v. A. Veeder Co., 199 La. 423, 6 So. 2d 335 (1942) (deed obtained
from transcript). See Gulf Refining Co. v. Goode, 212 La. 502, 32 So. 2d 904
(1947).
19. Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949) (deed
obtained from transcript). See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse,
238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960) (deed obtained from transcript).
20. Other instruments which unequivocally convey nothing more than a right
to share in any production obtained from the lands, and are not couched in
usual royalty or servitude language, are counted as royalty deeds:
(1) "one-half of the proceeds from the sale of oil or minerals under said
described land .. " Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Sanders, 224 La. 448, 450, 69
So.2d 745 (1953).
(2) "1/8 of all oil or other mineral substances produced from said tract of
land herein conveyed, free of all charges and expenses at the wells or mines
where produced." Gulf Refining Co. v. Hunter Co., 231 La. 1002, 1004, 93 So. 2d
537, 538 (1957).
The large interests which both of these deeds create in favor of the royalty
owners might lead to serious difficulties preventing development of the minerals.
21. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So. 2d 657 (1954) ; Gulf Refining
Co. v. Goode, 212 La. 502, 32 So. 2d 904 (1947); Standard Oil Co. v. Futral,
204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943) ; Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962) Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Richard, 127 So. 2d 816 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961); Cormier v. Ferguson, 92 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957) ; Smith v. Anisman, 85 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Bennett v.
Robinson, 25 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
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"Provided however, that Grantor reserves the right to
and authority to execute at any time a lease covering said
land without joinder of the Grantee, and all bonuses and
rentals received under such leases shall be the exclusive prop-
erty of the Grantor .... .
On all except one of these five occasions, the courts found min-
eral servitudes to have been conveyed.2 The four harmonious
22. (1) Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 713, 70 So. 2d 657, 658 (1954) :
"There is . . . reserved unto [vendor of the land] a one half mineral interest
in and to all mineral and mineral rights in and under the above described prop-
erty. It is provided, however, that the purchaser is hereby granted the privilege
of leasing the minerals and mineral rights, including the said reserved interest,
without joinder of [vendor] on the following conditions, to wit: .... "
(2) Standard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 230, 15 So. 2d 65, 70 (1943)
"[Vendor] grant [purchaser] 1/64 of all the oil, gas, sulphur, and other minerals
in and under, and that may be produced and saved from the following described
land ....
"It is understood and agreed that the purchaser is to receive as a royalty
. . . one-eighth (1/8) of all royalties received by vendor . . .; purchaser to re-
ceive said royalty under the now existing or any subsequent leases entered into
by vendor; vendor however specifically reserving the right to enter into any new
leasing contracts he may see fit .... "
(3) Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138, 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962):
"[Vendor] does grant . . . unto [vendee] . . . the following described property
to wit: One sixteenth (1/16) of the oil, gas, sulphur and other minerals, in
and under and that may be produced from the following described lands ....
"It is understood and agreed between the parties that no interest is sold in
any money rentals that may be hereafter paid in order to keep such lease in
effect without drilling but on the contrary, it is specifically understood that
any and all such money rental will be paid to the vendor herein."
(4) Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Richard, 127 So. 2d 816, 817 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961) : ". . . vendor reserves for himself, his heirs and assigns, an undivided
one-fourth of the oil, gas and other minerals under and produced and saved
from said land, which reservation is equal to a one-thirty-second royalty interest
under the said existing lease and as well a like royalty interest under future
mineral leases . . ., it being agreed and understood that this reservation is made
and granted subject to the right of the purchaser and heirs and assigns to
grant and execute such future oil, gas, and mineral leases affecting the whole or
any portion of the land conveyed hereunder, and this without the consent or
joinder therein of the vendor . . . and all down payments paid to obtain such
future leases, as well as all money, rental and/or bonuses received under such
future leases shall be the exclusive property of the purchaser and shall be paid
to him."
(5) Cormier v. Ferguson, 92 So. 2d 507, 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)
"[Grantor] . . . does hereby grant . . .unto [Grantee] an undivided one quarter
(1/4) interest in and to all oil, gas, sulphur and other minerals on, in and under
the following described land . ...
"This grant is subject to the mineral lease above mentioned but includes one-
quarter (1/4) of all the royalties in such lease. . . . Should said lease above
referred to expire, then Grantor shall have the right and authority to execute
at any time a lease or leases covering said land without joinder of the Grantee
herein or assigns, and all bonuses and rentals that may be paid for or under
such subsequent lease or leases shall be paid to Grantor . "
23. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So. 2d 657 (1954) ; Standard
Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Richard, 127 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Cormier v. Ferguson, 92
So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). Contra, Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d
138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) (mineral royalty).
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opinions gave great weight to the fact that the first paragraph
unquestionably was in the form of a conveyance of mineral
servitude. Referring to that paragraph, the Supreme Court in
Horn v. Skelly Oil Co. said that "such a reservation under our
long recognized and established jurisprudence constitutes a servi-
tude imposed upon the land."2 4 However, in Melancon v. Chera-
mie the First Circuit Court of Appeal said of the language in
the first paragraph, "there is no doubt that the clause is used
interchangeably in mineral and royalty sales. ' 25 There seems,
however, to be some doubt, for no prior Louisiana case was
found in which the sale of an interest "in the minerals in and
under and that may be produced from," not expressly modified
by the term royalty, was counted a mineral royalty conveyance. 26
In fact, it was the sale of minerals in and under the land that
was construed to be a servitude in the celebrated Salling's Heirs
case. 2T Hence the presence of the phrase is strong evidence of
the intent to convey a mineral servitude.
The proviso excepting lease rights from the conveyance has
been given various effects, from manifesting intention to convey
a servitude to being strong proof of a royalty deed. It has been
held to evidence a qualified mineral servitude, since it creates
a mandate coupled with an interest by which the grantee gives
the grantor the privilege of leasing the grantee's mineral rights.
A servitude owner, and not a royalty owner, has the right to
grant such leasing privileges .2  On the other hand, the court
that held a mineral royalty to have been created argued that
its purpose was simply to foreclose forever any controversy
over who is to receive the bonuses and rentals under a royalty
agreement.
29
Though the instrument itself is the best source of the parties'
24. 224 La. 709, 719, 70 So. 2d 657, 660 (1954).
25. 138 So. 2d 138, 144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
26. The abbreviated versions of the deeds cited by the court in Continental
Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949) and Crown Central Petro-
leum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960) might indicate
support for the assertion of the court in Melancon, but a check of the entire
deeds as set forth in the transcript dispels this doubt, since the interest is
specifically identified as royalty. (See the fifth royalty deed presented earlier
in the text.) The royalty deeds under discussion in Gulf Refining Co. v. Hunter,
231 La. 1002, 93 So. 2d 537 (1957) and Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Sanders, 224
La. 448, 69 So. 2d 745 (1953) do not specifically refer to the interest as royalty,
but the language was not that ordinarily held to create a servitude.
27. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1920).
28. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So. 2d 657 (1954).
29. Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
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intent, it may be so ambiguous as to defy interpretation. The
Civil Code provides for this contingency by authorizing the
courts to look elsewhere for evidence of their intent.80 The courts
have readily termed the instrument in question ambiguous, or
conceded it as such for the sake of argument, thus allowing
admission of parol evidence. The courts have also been very
liberal in admitting such extrinsic evidence as the testimony of
the parties, 31 the testimony of witnesses such as the notary
who drafted the instrument, 2 subsequent agreements between
the parties or with others concerning the same interest, 8 and
similar conveyances by the same parties to other persons. 34 In
those cases in which a mineral servitude was held to have been
conveyed, the courts have passed briefly over the evidence, find-
ing that it either substantiated or did not detract from the
court's conclusion. However, in Melancon, it seems that extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intent was the factor which most influ-
enced the court to hold the interest a mineral royalty. 5 The
testimony of the parties strongly indicated an intent to con-
vey royalty, although confusion surrounded preparation of the
deed.-36
The preceding discussion indicates that the first paragraph
of the controversial deed set forth above contains the "magic
words" '37 that create a mineral servitude. The second paragraph,
30. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1945-62 (1870).
31. Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) Cormier
v. Ferguson, 92 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
32. Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) Bennett
v. Robinson, 25 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
33. Gulf Refining Co. v. Goode, 212 La. 502, 32 So. 2d 904 (1947) ; Melancon
v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Richard, 127 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Cormier v. Ferguson, 92
So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
34. Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
35. Melancon, the vendor, had been extremely irritated by the loss of rental
payments due to a previous sale of a mineral servitude, and had vowed never
to sell more than royalty again. The vendee, Cheramie, also testified that he
had understood that he was purchasing "royalty acres." Unfortunately neither
could read, write, or speak English, nor even sign the act. The notary, admit-
tedly not fluent in French, testified that he had understood that a mineral servi-
tude, rather than a mineral royalty, was to be conveyed. Under these circum-
stances, the court declared that the "ambiguous" instrument transfered only a
royalty interest, as that was the intent of the parties. Melancon v. Cheramie,
138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
36. In ascertaining the parties' intention, the court may accord some weight
to the title or caption on the deed or to the endorsement on the check given in
payment for the mineral interest. Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962) (title and endorsement) ; Bennett v. Robinson, 25 So. 2d
641 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) (both).
37. ". . . [A]n undivided . .. [fractional] . .. interest in and to all of the
oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the
following described lands . .. ."
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however, strips the grantee of the usual rights of the owner of
a mineral servitude to lease and to share in rentals and bonuses.
In substance, the grantor has limited the servitude conveyed
by the first paragraph so that practically the grantee has no
control over its use.38 By the conveyance the grantee has gained
little more than the right of a royalty owner to receive a share
of production, thus leaving his interest more nearly a mineral
royalty than a mineral servitude. To determine the applicable
rules of prescription 9 or to quell controversies over rights not
stipulated in the agreement, '4 0 the courts must ascertain whether
the interest conveyed is a servitude or royalty. In this instance
the crux of the problem is whether to treat the interest as de-
scribed-a qualified mineral servitude-or, by closest analogy,
as conveyed-a mineral royalty. Should more weight be given
to form or substance?
In those instances in which the Louisiana courts have been
called upon to determine the nature of such interest, they defi-
nitely seem to have accepted a formulary, rather than a substan-
tive, approach. Once the interest has been described in the form
of a mineral servitude, later qualification will not convert it
into a mineral royalty even though such qualification placed
very serious limitations on the usual servitude rights. This is
clearly indicated by the four decisions41 holding the interest con-
veyed by the quoted controversial deed to be a qualified mineral
servitude.42 Even in Melancon, which ruled in favor of a min-
38. The mineral servitude owner, grantee in the quoted deed, may have the
right to go upon the land and search for oil and gas until the grantor executes
a lease. However, since most exploration and development is carried out under
a mineral lease, such a right would be of little consequence. Further develop-
ment of the concept that a reservation of lease rights creates a mandate coupled
with an interest may result in some fiduciary obligations upon the grantor to
lease. Nevertheless, the development of such obligations would not result in the
grantee's interest being less passive.
39. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So. 2d 657 (1954) (whether
landowner or servitude owner benefited by prescription of the interest); Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943) (whether the interest
had prescribed); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Richard, 127 So. 2d 816 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961) (same) ; Cormier v. Ferguson, 92 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957) (same).
40. Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) (dispute
over lease rights).
41. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So. 2d 657 (1954); Standard
Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Richard, 127 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Cormier v. Ferguson, 92 So. 2d
507 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
42. The courts in the three other cases cited in note 21, supra, in which
instruments were alleged to convey mineral servitudes by one party and mineral
royalties by the other also support the adoption of the formulary approach. Gulf
Refining Co. v. Goode, 212 La. 502, 504, 32 So. 2d 904, 905 (1947) ("1/64th
royalty in all oil, gas and mineral rights" construed to be a mineral royalty);
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eral royalty, the court was more concerned with form than sub-
stance when it found that the instrument was ambiguous. 43
Legal and Policy Considerations
Whether the court will continue to utilize a formulary ap-
proach in more extreme situations is another matter.44 Suppose
an instrument described the interest conveyed as a mineral
servitude, but subsequent qualifications stripped that interest
Smith v. Anisman, 85 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ("1/6 of the oil, gas
and other minerals, in and under and that may be produced" construed to be a
mineral servitude) ; Bennett v. Robinson, 25 So. 2d 641, 642 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1946) ("one-half interest in and to the oil, gas and other minerals in, under
and that may be produced from" held to be a mineral servitude). None of these
deeds qualified the interest conveyed. Thus no real issue between form and
substance was raised.
By and large, common law jurisdictions treat deeds containing provisions
similar to those set out above as transfers of royalty. Hudgins v. Lincoln Nat.
Life Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Tex. 1956) ; Skelly Oil Co. v. Cities Service
Oil Co., 160 Kan. 226, 160 P.2d 246 (1945) ; 1 WILLIA S & MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW §§ 303-304.10 (1959). However, with the ever-present possibility of
prescription, a different situation exists in Louisiana, making the distinction
between royalty and servitude interests extremely important. A party might bar-
gain away some or all of his participating rights, but have every intention of
facing prescription as a mineral servitude owner. The real issue would seem
to be how far the court will allow a party to qualify the ordinary rights of a
servitude owner before declaring that substantively the interest is no more than
royalty. This problem is discussed later in the text.
43. Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962). Its result
differs from the other four decisions only because of the nature of the parol
evidence admitted to show the intention of the parties. In effect, the court of
appeal ascertained this intent, and then construed the "ambiguous deed" to express
it. But, in light of the prior jurisprudence definitively holding that such instru-
ments convey a servitude, it seems that such deeds are not actually ambiguous.
Perhaps another method of reaching the same equitable result should have been
chosen, especially in view of the notary's testimony that he thought the convey-
ance was of a mineral servitude. Reformation is a jurisprudentially recognized
remedy for those who find that the act executed by them does not express their
intent. Wilson v. Levy, 234 La. 719, 101 So. 2d 214 (1958) ; Reynaud v. Bullock,
195 La. 86, 196 So. 29 (1940) ; Rodgers v. S. H. Bolinger Co., 149 La. 545, 89
So. 688 (1921); Comment, 30 TUL. L. REV. 486 (1956). Reformation can be
supported on the basis of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1762 (1870). However, reformation
will not be granted unless there is strong proof that the actual intent and agree-
ment of the parties was at variance with their expressed words. If, as seems
to be the situation in Melancon, there is "clear proof of the antecedent contract,
and of the error in committing it to writing" (Rodgers v. S. H. Bolinger Co.,
149 La. 545, 549, 89 So. 688, 690 (1921)), then the parties are entitled to have
the instrument reformed. If the Melancon case is rationalized in this manner,
the jurisprudence appears more consistent.
44. There are situations in which the court has regarded the substantive rights
conveyed more important than the form of the conveyance: Reinerth v. Rhody,
52 La. Ann. 2029, 28 So. 277 (1900) (sale without consideration supported as
donation) ; McWilliams v. McWilliams, 39 La. Ann. 924, 3 So. 62 (1887) (same) ;
D'Orgenoy v. Droz, 13 La. 382 (1839) (same) ; Haggard v. Rushing, 76 So. 2d 52
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ("right to use" was held to create a usufruct and not
the right of use). Contra, Loranger v. Citizens' National Bank, 162 La. 1054, 111
So. 418 (1927) (sale invalid on face as between husband and wife cannot be
supported as a donation).
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of all development and lease rights. Would the courts hold that
the running of prescription was interrupted by an unsuccessful
use under a lease from the grantor over which the grantee had
no control, or would the court be forced to hold the interest to
be royalty because functionally it has none of the substantive
attributes of a servitude? A converse situation would exist if
the ordinary royalty rights are enlarged, rather than those of
a servitude restricted, by a conveyance of an interest which is
expressly referred to as royalty, but which gives the grantee
the right of ingress and egress for exploration and development,
coupled with the right to lease the interest and receive lease
bonuses and rentals.45  Would this be treated as royalty, thus
prescribing as such even if, for instance, the grantee spent vast
sums of money drilling numerous, but unsuccessful, wells? In
more extreme situations such as these, whether the courts would
continue to focus their attention more strongly on form than
substance depends upon the code compulsions and public policy
governing the prescriptive regimes of mineral servitudes and
mineral royalties and possibly, as suggested by the latter situa-
tion, upon the equities of the individual case.4 6
The influx of law and public policy into the problem of
classification is demonstrated by the following situation: Sup-
pose a grantee desired only a royalty right with the exception
45. The deed in Mt. Forest Fur Farms v. Cockrell, 179 La. 795, 155 So. 228
(1934) was similar to the above except that the right to rentals and bonuses was
not expressly reserved in addition to the right to lease. The court held that the
exclusive right to lease carried with it all lease rights including the right to the
rentals and bonuses. However, the court did not pass on the exact nature of the
interest created, and the case in fact arose before the distinction between royalty
and servitude was settled in Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
Ledoux v. Voorhies, 222 La. 200, 62 So. 2d 273 (1952) reaffirmed the proposition
that the right to lease implies the right to the bonuses and rentals, and gave a
slight indication that the interest in the Cockrell case was royalty. However, the
nature of the interest was not there in question.
46. The cases previously discussed in the text stand for the proposition that
one may exclude lease rights from a conveyance which creates a servitude without
affecting the nature of the interest. However, in the latest Supreme Court case
in this area there are indications that there may be a terminal point for a formu-
lary approach. The majority in Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So. 2d
657 (1954) emphasized that the proviso excluding lease rights did not reduce the
interest to mere royalty, but instead created a mandate coupled with an interest.
The concurring opinion stressed the fact that "without waiving or relinquishing
its right of exploring for the retained minerals or of executing a lease therefor, the
vendor merely gave to the purchaser the privilege (not an exclusive one) or the
authority of leasing such interest, if and when he could, and then only under cer-
tain stipulated conditions." Id. at 725, 70 So. 2d at 662. The dissenting opinion
actually utilized a substantive approach, adopting the trial judge's findings that
" 'regardless of what name might have been used in the first sentence of the con-
tract, . . . the second sentence qualifies, limits and restricts it to a royalty inter-
est only . . ..." Id. at 729, 70 So. 2d at 664.
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that he also desired the prescriptive advantages of a servitude.
An attempt to reach this end through the guise of a qualified
mineral servitude is set forth above. Would the grantee, how-
ever, transgress any law or public policy if he eliminated the
necessity for court determination for purposes of prescription
of the nature of his interest by expressly stipulating that his
interest was a mineral royalty, but that prescription would be
interrupted by a use by the landowner, mineral servitude owner,
or their mineral lessee sufficient to interrupt prescription of a
mineral servitude?
The answer appears to depend upon whether the more rigor-
ous rules of liberative prescription imposed upon mineral royal-
ties is supported by any compulsion that does not apply to min-
eral servitudes or is merely a suppletive provision applied by
the courts in the absence of any indication by the parties of an
intention to the contrary. The position that the prescription of
a mineral royalty is merely suppletive requires the recognition
of a single policy requirement regarding mineral development
and the absence of any legal requirement that the interruption
of prescription be conditioned on production alone. It necessi-
tates the recognition of a broad range of possible conditional
obligations limited only by the fact that public policy dictates
that no interest can be created more extensive than a mineral
servitude. This position finds support in the courts' develop-
ment of the concept that a royalty right is an "appendage" of
the mineral servitude, 47 since the only limitation on an append-
age could be that it can never be greater than that to which it
appends. Thus it could be argued that the only restriction on
freedom to contract regarding mineral interests is that a right
to a share of production can never be more permanent than
a mineral servitude.48
47. Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1958)
Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949). Earlier cases
such as Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178 (1947) ; St.
Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947) ; and Vincent v.
Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) indicated that the concepts of mineral
royalty and mineral servitude were quite distinct and that there was little to be
gained by analogy. However, later cases, especially with regard to the appendage
concept, have demonstrated a much closer relationship between servitudes and
royalties.
48. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 938, 132 So. 2d 845,
853 (1961) : "Parties to a contract are free to stipulate as they please so long
as their stipulations are not contrary to good morals or public policy or do not
violate some law . . . . It has also been recognized in this state . . . that those
entering into a contract may stipulate a different period of prescription or limita-
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There are, on the other hand, at least two considerations
suggesting that the differences between royalty prescription and
servitude prescription are mandatory rather than suppletive.
One stems from the code provisions which gave rise to the con-
cepts that good faith drilling regardless of success interrupts
prescription on a mineral servitude and production, on a mineral
royalty. A servitude, by its very nature, creates the right to
use the estate of another as, for instance, the mineral servitude
gives the right to go upon the land and reduce the minerals to
possession. Hence the use of a servitude is the exercise of the
right created. 49 The mineral royalty, however, is not the right
to use but the right to share in production. Hence it could be
argued that if interruption of prescription is dependent upon
the exercise of the right conveyed, then production alone will
rescue the royalty from extinction by prescription regardless of
whether the existence of the right is conditioned, as in the above
example, on a "servitude use."'5
The other consideration is that public policy may dictate that
prescription on a mineral royalty should be more stringent than
that of a mineral servitude. It is possible that, as a corollary
to the public policy embodied in the servitude theory which seeks
to encourage the development of the natural resources of the
state, there is a public interest in discouraging the existence of
passive rights which cannot further the development of minerals
and which, because they reduce the fraction of ultimate pro-
duction available for leasing, may actually deter development.
Though a mineral royalty is an appendage of a mineral servi-
tude, the appendage is a more onerous burden than the servitude
in this respect. Thus the rule requiring production to interrupt
prescription on a mineral royalty may be mandatory, not sup-
pletive, with definite legal or policy considerations limiting the
parties' freedom of contract.5 1
tion from that provided by a state statute, and that the limitation or prescriptive
period as thus stipulated, if reasonable, will be binding upon the parties."
49. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 789 (1870). "A right to servitude is extinguished by
the non-usage of the same during ten years."
50. Id. art. 3529. "This prescription has also the effect of releasing the owner
of an estate from every species of real rights, to which the property may have
been subject, if the person in possession of the right ha8 not eaercised it during
the time required by law." (Emphasis added.)
51. No case was found in which the court articulated the desire to discourage
passive interests. However, the very acceptance of the concept that a royalty is
an obligation conditioned on production, rather than a concept more closely
analogous to servitude theories, may indicate such a desire. Support for this may
be found in the stringency with which the court applies the rule that there must




If these legal and policy considerations prevent the parties
from stipulating a more liberal prescriptive period than that
attributed to the ordinary mineral royalty, then the courts
should proscribe attempts to reach the same end functionally
through the subterfuge of a qualified mineral servitude. Pre-
scription is a prime consideration in all mineral conveyances
but is seldom mentioned in conveyance instruments. It would
seem that the parties should spell out their understanding upon
a matter so crucial as prescription in mineral conveyances. The
courts should not declare a conveyance null if the stipulated
prescription transgressed law or public policy, but should simply
disregard the stipulation and apply the rules of prescription
according to the nature of the interest. 52 Therefore, stipulation
of the prescription applicable to the conveyance should only
clarify, and never endanger, an interest which lies between an
ordinary mineral royalty and an ordinary mineral servitude.
CONCLUSIONS
The courts have adopted a formulary approach to classifi-
cation of interests which lie between the ordinary mineral servi-
tude and the ordinary mineral royalty-once the interest is de-
scribed in the form of either a servitude or a royalty, later quali-
fications will not convert it into the other. Indicative of this
approach are the courts' holdings that servitudes were conveyed
by instruments in which the usual mineral servitude rights were
qualified to the extent that its owner had no right to grant
leases or receive bonuses and rentals therefrom. The possibility
remains that further qualification of the servitude rights will
create an interest so closely akin to a mineral royalty that the
courts will feel constrained to declare the interest to be royalty.
86 So. 2d 50 (1956) ; Union Sulphur Co. v. Andrau, 217 La. 662, 47 So. 2d 38
(1950) ; Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178 (1947)) when
compared with the leniency with which the court applies the rules concerning the
use of servitudes in similar situations. McMurrey v. Gray, 216 La. 904, 45 So. 2d
73 (1949).
52. In the absence of any stipulation regarding prescription, the language of
conveyance instruments generally indicates that the interest is perpetual. The
court does not declare the conveyance null for this reason, but simply supplies
the applicable rules of prescription. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35
(1939) ; Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922). It would seem, therefore, that the stipulation of a prohibited prescriptive
period would not have a more adverse effect than an indication that the interest
is perpetual. To assure this result the parties could stipulate that the prescrip-
tion clause is severable.
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Whether mineral interests can be created which have few or no
rights of a mineral servitude except a share of production, yet
are governed by the rules of prescription on servitudes, awaits
elucidation of the legal and policy considerations governing min-
eral interests. In any event, it would seem beneficial, both to
the parties to the conveyance and to the court which must in-
terpret it, for the parties to stipulate the rules of prescription
which they intend to apply to their agreement.
William Shelby McKenzie
DISMISSAL OF LOUISIANA STATE CIVIL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES
The Louisiana Civil Service System is designed to establish
as the basis of public employment a merit system of fitness and
efficiency. A consequence of such a system is the elimination
of appointment to or discharge from public office for political
consideration.' Proper functioning of a merit system, however,
requires an effective means of discharging employees who im-
pair the efficient operation of the public service.2 This Comment
will critically consider the grounds and procedures for dismissal
of Louisiana civil service employeess and for review of the dis-
missal by the Civil Service Commission and the courts.
Grounds for Dismissal
The Louisiana Constitution creates the Civil Service System4
and provides that no person who has gained permanent civil
service status5 shall be dismissed by his "appointing authority"6
1. Gervais v. New Orleans Police Dept., 226 La. 782, 77 So.2d 393 (1954) ;
State ex rel. Murtagh v. Department of Civil Service, 215 La. 1007, 42 So.2d 65
(1949); Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 So.2d 49
(1942); Carr v. New Orleans Police Dept., 144 So.2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) ; Gremillion v. Department of Highways, 129 So.2d 805 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961).
2. Boucher v. Heard, 228 La. 1078, 84 So.2d 827 (1955) ; In re Coon, 141
So.2d 112 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
3. The role of the New Orleans City Civil Service Commission is beyond the
scope of this Comment. However, as much of the jurisprudence concerning the
New Orleans Commission is applicable to the State Commission, cases dealing
with the former will be cited throughout this paper as authority whenever they
are applicable.
4. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.
5. A civil service employee is appointed for a probationary period of six months
before being eligible for permanent status. CIVIL SERvIcE RuxLs, rule 9.1(a),
a8 amended, 1957.
6. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.1(3) (b) defines "appointing authority" as "any
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